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T his article discusses various hypotheses relating to the origin 
and operation of business groups in Mexico, and it proposes a model to 
explain the sources of their total asset growth. It highlights their growing 
contribution to Mexican gdp, but notes that their shares of employment 
and profits are smaller. Over time, sales and assets have clearly tended 
to become more concentrated in the largest groups. The paper concludes 
that the main financing sources for asset growth between 2005 and 2007 
were firstly debt and secondly capital contributions from shareholders. It 
also finds that the leading groups invest discretely over time and tend to 
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The presence of business groups has been a longstanding 
and important source of debate because they account 
for a large share of  production, investment and 
employment in some countries; and they have been 
the protagonists of industrialization processes in many 
cases. The recent return to more specialized and less 
diversified business structures has not diminished 
their preponderance internationally. This view of 
business groups coexists with others that see them 
as reflecting market distortions or failures with the 
potential to impair competitive processes.
The study of enterprises and business groups in 
Mexico is not recent. Basave and Hernández (2007, 
pp. 94-119) review its evolution, starting with the 
pioneering work of Cossío Villegas and Ceceña in 
the 1970s, which focused on industrialization and 
monopolies. Subsequently, in the import-substitution 
strategy and closed-economy phase, the focus was 
turned towards concentration in the different sectors 
and branches of  the economy, and on the role of 
foreign direct investment (fdi). In the 1980s, industrial 
development tended to be explained in terms of the 
influence of financial capital (before and after the 
1982 crisis); and, more recently, the approach has 
sought to explain trans-nationalization and the export 
dynamic of large Mexican firms. 
In the real world, Latin American business 
groups, including Mexican ones, have arisen mainly 
in three periods (Mortimore and Peres, 2001, p. 51). 
During the country’s first industrialization wave at 
end of the nineteenth century, business groups created 
large manufacturing factories that were not formally 
integrated, and set up banks to finance them. In the 
second industrialization wave starting in the 1930s, 
a network of firms emerged that were held together 
through holding companies (Chavarín, 2006, pp. 
195-196). In the third wave, new business groups 
were formed as part of  the neoliberal productive 
restructuring —characterized by privatization, 
deregulation and globalization— which began in 
the 1980s (Fernández, 2000, p. 97). Among the 10 
leading Mexican groups, three large groups stand 
out: Slim, Zambrano-Cementos Mexicanos (Cemex) 
and Salinas Pliego-Elektra.
The universe of large firms located in Mexico 
includes transnational enterprises, the strengthening 
and modernization of  traditional groups and the 
emergence of new and very powerful conglomerates 
formed since the 1980s. Domestic firms grew rapidly in 
size and developed into a medium-sized transnational 
structure, as a result of goods and capital exports, while 
ownership maintained the traditional profiles (Garrido, 
1997, pp. 8-9). In response to trade liberalization 
and the North American Free Trade Agreement, 
firms targeting the domestic market entered strategic 
partnerships with foreign firms, raised entry barriers 
(through preventive investments), and deployed a 
combination of market power and political relations 
(Garrido, 2001, pp. 2-3). 
This article has several aims. Firstly, it will briefly 
review explanations of the origin and maintenance of 
business groups, and propose a model to explain the 
sources of total asset growth. Secondly, it will present 
and process statistical data to assess the importance of 
the leading groups in the Mexican economy in terms 
of gross domestic product (gdp), employment and 
profits. Thirdly, it will explore the growth dynamic 
of Mexican business groups between 2004 and 2007, 
based on the model developed in the first part and 
on a cross-section equation. 
The article consists of three sections and final 
thoughts. The first part reviews and evaluates the 
concepts of diversification, synergy, networks, various 
hypotheses on the emergence and operation of business 
groups, and a simple model to explain the sources 
of  asset growth among those groups. The second 
part discusses the importance of these groups in the 
Mexican economy and the levels of asset, liability and 
capital concentration within them. The third section 
explores the growth sources of these groups during 
the period under analysis. Lastly, two annexes set out 
the data used in the regression analysis.
This article does not analyse the transnational 
firms or medium- and small- scale enterprises with 
which the most important Mexican business groups 
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to act under the business-group modality. The paper 
also does not review the history of large Mexican 
business groups and their relations with the State, 
nor does it analyse the specific behavior of any of 
them in times of boom (Garrido, 2002; Castañeda, 
2004) or crisis (Garrido, 2001). 
II
diversification, contribution and growth 
possibilities of business groups
The fundamental issue for defining business groups 
is diversification. While this concept and how to 
measure it do get discussed, the most traditional 
approach is to define the business group in terms of 
active participation in various different business areas 
that may or may not be related (Huerta and Navas, 
2007, pp. 134-135). The next issue to consider is the 
relation between diversification and business results. 
Here, the same authors claim that the link between 
diversification and results remains inconclusive, 
despite numerous studies. Nonetheless, they infer, 
firstly, that diversified firms achieve better results 
than single-business enterprises, ceteris paribus; and 
firms that are diversified within related areas perform 
better than those whose diversification is unrelated 
(ibid., pp. 138 and 141).
The synergy and network concepts are fundamental 
for understanding business groupings. In the case of 
synergy, Huerta and Navas (2007, pp. 137-138) state 
that related resources between businesses generate 
synergies (the whole is greater than the sum of the 
parts) that enhance overall corporate value; whereas 
formal and informal networks provide a way to 
reduce transaction costs in the market by choosing 
less expensive resources. Such networks can also be 
viewed from the social standpoint, prioritizing personal 
contacts as a key tool for obtaining the desired results 
(Levanti, 2001, p. 1,046).
The term “business group” should be understood 
as a form of  business network that arises from a 
specific combination of organizational architecture 
and corporate governance, in which a group of firms 
is controlled by a small number of large shareholders, 
usually members of an extended family or a closed 
circle of associates with mutual social ties. Transactions 
between the firms in a group are usually sustained 
over the long term and respond to institutional 
shortcomings, such as the functioning or formation of 
certain markets (credit, for example), the availability 
of certain workers or inputs, the presence of market 
failures; or else they are explained in economic-policy, 
sociological, culturalist or other terms (Chavarín, 
2006, pp. 194 and 195). 
The market-failure or imperfections approach 
claims that business groups overcome difficulties in 
obtaining capital, specialized labour, raw materials, 
components and technology in emerging economies 
(Guillén, 2000, p. 363). Along the same lines, Rendón 
(1997, p. 5) argues that groups emerge in response to 
the uncertainty of  guaranteeing quality and timely 
delivery of  the inputs they need for production 
and sales.
The second approach, favoured by sociologist-
economists, argues that firms replicate the surrounding 
social structure, such that patterns of vertical, horizontal 
and reciprocal authority affect business organization 
and relations between firms. These patterns of authority 
are assumed to be relatively stable through time and 
resistant to external pressures. Key examples can be 
found in the Republic of Korea (vertical structure), 
Taiwan Province of China (horizontal), and Japan 
(reciprocal). In the third approach, the growth of 
business groups in newly industrialized countries 
is associated with policies to promote economic 
development implemented by the Government or 
banks, or both, in which the Government prefers 
to deal with few enterprises as agents of the private 
sector (Guillén, 2000, pp. 363 and 364).
Another way of visualizing theories that explain 
the emergence of business groups has been proposed 
by Tarziján and Paredes (2006, pp. 56-58), who argue 
that the structure of business groups originally reflected 
the economic incentives prevailing in the region at the 
time; and that this organizational structure is now less 
useful and has varied, as a result of changes in the 
institutions that gave rise to those incentives. Moreover, 
the hypothesis propounded by these authors is that 
business groups form and consolidate to generate a 
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structure and network of influences that affords them 
access to political power and, thereby, enhances their 
economic capacity and action.
Khanna and Yafeh (2007, pp. 333, 336-341) 
set forth and analyse six hypotheses to explain the 
formation of business groups, the persistence of such 
groups in different settings, and some of their welfare 
implications. The first hypothesis claims that diversified 
business groups are more common in economies that 
have less developed market institutions. Following 
an extensive bibliographic review, they conclude that 
capital-market under-development is not a decisive 
factor in forming a business group. Apparently, 
other types of institutions and situations are more 
important, such as vague labour laws, low skill levels 
among workers and managers, or a desire to reduce 
the tax burden. There is also no clear linear correlation 
between greater diversification and higher profits. In 
general, the results are ambiguous, for example in the 
Chilean case —with well developed capital markets 
and more or less clear labour laws— the formation of 
groups with diversification aims has intensified.
The second hypothesis developed by Khanna and 
Yafeh (2007, pp. 341-343) argues that the formation 
of  business groups, through vertical integration 
and the volume of intragroup exchange, tends to be 
greater when legal and judicial institutions are poorly 
developed, implying higher contracting costs. The 
evidence does not support this hypothesis, however, and 
vertical integration would seem to be more reflective 
of  a firm’s desire to increase its monopoly power. 
The third hypothesis claims that the formation of 
pyramid-type groups (controlled by a few shareholders) 
is common in countries where the law provides weak 
protection for investors. This in turn forces investors 
to seek a discount when they buy shares in a firm 
belonging to an business group.
No evidence has been found to support this 
hypothesis. Pyramid groups tend to form in cases 
where the State has implemented laws to support or 
protect industries, for example the Chaebol of the 
Republic of Korea. Group formation in such cases 
has more to do with stabilizing earnings rather than 
maximizing them. Moreover, these groups seek to 
spread the support and subsidies they receive from 
the State among their members. Group structures 
also enable firms to overinvest for the purpose of 
erecting defences or barriers against other domestic 
or external competitors.
The fourth hypothesis states that family control 
of  business groups is more common in countries 
where laws are inadequate and transactions with third 
parties are costly. Such groups also continue to exist 
for societal reasons going beyond family ties. The 
family presence tends to be greater in countries that 
have poorly developed institutions and markets. For 
example, in Singapore and Malaysia, nine out of 10 
and 35 out of 50 groups had managers drawn from 
the respective controlling families. Similarly, there 
are social, cultural, institutional and other factors 
extending beyond the purely economic rationale, which 
determine and influence the creation, preservation and 
operation of business groups (Khanna and Yafeh, 
2007, pp. 348-351). 
The fifth hypothesis argues that while the 
creation, expansion and diversification of business 
groups occurs as a result of government support, their 
profitability depends on the skills and opportunities 
they succeed in harnessing. Thus, evidence shows 
that business groups in many countries were formed 
thanks to deliberate support from the Government. 
Nonetheless, while it was possible to confirm that 
such support is very important to the formation of 
business groups, in other countries, groups have also 
arisen with little or no government help. The general 
pattern, however, is that the vast majority of business 
groups initially consist of  families with very close 
links to the Government of the day.
Under their own dynamic, business groups 
accumulate both economic and political influence 
and power. This causes their relation with the State 
domain to be fluctuating, ambiguous, and changing, 
which sometimes elicits a reaction by the State to try to 
reduce their influence. As a result, their representatives 
have to lobby intensively to avoid falling out of favour 
with the authorities. In some circumstances, groups 
also confront the State, for example in attempts to 
resist anti-trust and other similar regulations. Khanna 
and Yafeh (2007, pp. 352-361) find a fruitful relation 
between the State and business groups, which also has 
its setbacks since it involves a game between the two 
parties, and the games are typically complex. Although 
they cohabit, their coexistence is not easy.
The final hypothesis proposed by Khanna and 
Yafeh (2007, pp. 361-362) focuses on the fact that 
business groups engage in a number of uncompetitive 
practices that tend to increase market power; and 
this monopoly power is reflected in high rates of 
profit —especially when they can establish trade 
barriers and the regulatory framework promoting 
competition is weak. On this point, it is not entirely 
clear whether increasing the degree of  monopoly 
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increases profits. In such variable environments, it 
impossible to create stable conditions to guarantee 
a given level of monopoly and abundant profits; and 
perhaps this explains why business groups are forever 
trying to influence government decisions.
Following this bibliographic review, we now 
design a model to explain the sources of expansion 
of business groups, based on a breakdown between 
domestic financing (retained profits) and external 
financing. The starting point is the balance sheet of 
these groups, where the year-on-year change in total 
assets (A) in a given year, compared to the previous 
one, is equal to the sum of year-on-year variations 
of liabilities (L) and capital (E). Total assets include 
financial assets (including investments), fixed and 
other assets, reflecting the fact that a group can expand 
through different channels. Equation (2) shows these 
changes in discrete terms, where the asset growth may 
be financed through debt (liabilities) or equity.
 A A L L E Et t t t t t− = −( ) + −( )− − −1 1 1  (1)
 ∆ ∆ ∆A L E= +  (2)
This article will not discuss the constraints on 
external financing, but it is clear that this is possible 
provided certain proportions are maintained in 
relation to equity growth. Normally, no group will 
borrow in excess of the standards of the activity in 
question, which traditionally are related to a given 
proportion of the capital contributions made by the 
partners in the business group. Capital growth occurs 
as a result of profits earned in the fiscal year (P) and 
capital expansions, either direct or through the stock 
market (NS). The group’s external debt is defined as a 
proportion of the increase in equity, considering two 
ratios linked to the total of liabilities with respect to 
total assets (α) and assets in relation to capital (β)
of  equations (3) and (4), which are substituted in 








= β  (4)
 ∆A NS P= +( ) +( )1 αβ  (5)
Profits can be explained by various traditional 
variables, such as the product of return on equity 
(roe) and capital in equation (6); or the return on 
sales (ros) multiplied by total sales (S) , the latter 
being the product of the business group’s share of 
the total sales of the activity (χ), the activity’s share 
in gdp (δ ), and gdp itself, as shown in equation 
(7). No distinction is made here between profits and 
retained profits after dividend distribution.
 ∆A NS roeE= +( ) +1 αβ ( ) (6)
 
∆A NS ros Y= +( ) + ( ) 1 αβ χδ  (7)
The total-asset growth of any business group 
is explained directly by the growth of output;1 the 
possibilities of  increasing capital with the same 
partners, new partners (or both); or through the stock 
market. Asset growth is also affected directly by the 
ratios liabilities/total assets, total assets/capital, and 
return on sales of the business group, and by share 
of the firm and activity in the economy. 
1  For simplicity, the analysis excludes external sales, which would 
depend on the dynamic of the product or service internationally 
and its external competitiveness.
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The available statistical information on national 
business groups comes from the journal Expansión, 
which publishes a report on the 100 largest firms 
in Mexico every year between late April and June. 
This publication provides information on domestic 
enterprises and the firms under their control ranked 
in descending order. For the purposes of this article, 
information has been selected from the last four 
years (2004-2007), published between 2005 and 2008, 
since it is more homogeneous.2 These 100 leading 
enterprises, which engage in various economic 
activities, do not generally operate in isolation, but 
form large organizations that function as business 
groups (Rendón and Morales, 2008b, p. 1,184).
The report presents the following information for 
each business group: sales, stockmarket capitalization, 
volume traded on the Mexican stock market, number 
of workers, net profit, return on equity (roe), the ratio 
between the share price and earnings per share at the 
end of December each year, and the asset/debt ratio. 
To supplement this information, it also shows market 
share and the index of economic power calculated by 
Expansión. In the first year only (2004), the report also 
contains records on total assets and equity.
We used partial the information provided by 
Expansión for 2004, 2005, 2006 and 2007 to estimate 
total assets, liabilities and capital for each and every 
group. Equity (E) was estimated on the basis of 
knowledge of net profit for the fiscal year (P) and 
the rate of return on equity (roe) shown in equation 
(8). Total liabilities (L) were determined from the 
accounting identity which states that total assets are 
equal to liabilities plus equity, as shown in equation 
(9). Dividing each side of this expression by (L) gives 







2  The information contained in Expansión on the 100 Mexican 
enterprises goes back further, but unfortunately it is not comparable 
over time.






= +1  (10)
The results thus obtained revealed a number of 
inconsistencies in the information. In some enterprises, 
the value of total assets, liabilities and equity were 
sharply different between 2006 and 2007. It was found 
that the inconsistencies occurred when returns on 
equity changed significantly without any relation to 
what was happening with net profits. The case of the 
first Mexican group (Slim) is illustrative, since return 
on equity (roe) fell from 26.4% to 12.6% between 2006 
and 2007, while profits rose from 77,450 million pesos 
to 122,370 million pesos, and the ratio total assets/
liabilities remained constant at 1.6.
To correct this problem, various alternatives 
were evaluated, considering ranges in the variation in 
sales, in roe, in net profit, and in the total assets/debt 
ratio. These were evaluated conceptually and then 
applied to the database. Nonetheless, a new criterion 
was ultimately adopted whereby the roe for 2007 
would be equal to that of  the previous year (2006), 
multiplied by the profits of  2007 and divided by the 
profits of  2006. This made it possible to avoid sharp 
variations in capital, and hence in liabilities and in 
total assets. Moreover, to guarantee data consistency, 
it was decided to eliminate all information from the 
enterprise or business group for a given year if  data 
were missing on total assets, liabilities or equity. 
Maintaining that enterprise would have meant 
affecting the balance of  the sum of balance sheets 
(or the financial situation statement).
For the 100 largest enterprises in Mexico, table 1 
shows their gdp, wage-earning employment, the 
employed population and operating profits for the years 
under analysis. To analyse the degree of concentration 
or dispersion, information is also presented for the 
first five groups (6 - 10) and for groups 11-20, 21-30, 
31-40, 41-50 and 51-100.
The total sales of  the 100 enterprises with 
respect to gdp grew between 2005 and 2007, reaching 
the equivalent of 22.9% of gdp in the latter year. 
III
Participation by business groups
in the Mexican economy
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TABLE 1
Contribution of Mexican business groups to gdp,
employment, and operating profits 
(Percentages)
Groups Year Gross domestic 
product
Employment Operating profit
Wage- earners Employed population
Groups 1 - 5 2004 11.87 2.05 1.17 2.12
2005 9.60 1.70 1.00 2.03
2006 10.09 1.68 1.01 2.08
2007 10.65 1.78 1.08 ...
Groups 6 - 10 2004 3.47 0.68 0.39 0.50
2005 2.77 0.95 0.56 0.47
2006 2.51 0.73 0.44 0.44
2007 3.48 0.97 0.59 ...
Groups 1 - 10 2004 15.34 2.73 1.56 2.62
2005 12.37 2.66 1.56 2.50
2006 12.59 2.42 1.45 2.51
2007 14.13 2.75 1.66 ...
Groups 11 - 20 2004 3.32 0.97 0.55 0.44
2005 3.08 0.89 0.52 0.47
2006 4.09 1.24 0.75 0.52
2007 3.36 1.16 0.70 ...
Groups 21 - 30 2004 1.57 0.64 0.37 0.08
2005 2.10 0.66 0.39 0.20
2006 2.03 0.68 0.41 0.19
2007 2.17 0.72 0.44 ...
Groups 31 - 40 2004 1.21 0.38 0.22 0.09
2005 1.57 0.46 0.27 0.12
2006 0.99 0.35 0.21 0.11
2007 1.27 0.36 0.22 ...
Groups 41 - 50 2004 1.18 0.29 0.17 0.07
2005 0.40 0.20 0.12 0.08
2006 0.78 0.33 0.20 0.07
2007 0.51 0.21 0.13 ...
Groups 51 - 100 2004 1.51 0.47 0.27 0.03
2005 1.49 0.51 0.30 0.12
2006 1.58 0.53 0.32 0.11
2007 1.49 0.61 0.37 ...
Total 2004 24.13 5.48 3.14 3.32
2005 21.01 5.39 3.16 3.49
2006 22.06 5.54 3.33 3.51
2007 22.91 5.81 3.51 ...
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (inegi).
Nonetheless, this was a smaller share than in 2004. 
The first five groups alone account for 10.7% of 
gdp; while the first 10 produced 14.1% of gdp in 
2007, groups 11-20 contributed 3.4%; groups 21-30 
contributed 2.2%; groups 31-40 contributed 1.3%; 
groups 41-50 contributed 0.5%; and groups 51-100 
contributed 1.5% of gdp. Between 2005 and 2007, 
there is a greater concentration of national output 
in domestic groups generally, although less among 
the first 10 groups.
Is worth noting that gdp grew between 3% and 
3.5% per year in the period under analysis, quite close 
to the long-term historical average, despite the fact 
that oil prices were rising. Inflation rates fluctuated 
between 5.2% and 3.3% per year, while the exchange 
rate against the dollar remained broadly stable. The 
purchasing power of wage earners, the external sector, 
the financial sector and public finance all maintained 
their trends of previous years.
The 100 largest enterprises provided just over 
1.5 million permanent jobs in 2007, representing an 
insignificant 5.8% of  total wage-earners (persons 
receiving wages and salaries) and just 3.5% of the 
employed population nationwide. 
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Employment is less concentrated than total sales 
in relation to gdp, since the 10 leading groups provided 
just 2.8% of national wage-earning employment in 
2007, and 1.7% of the total employed population. 
The first five groups accounted for 1.8% of wage-
earning employment, and 1.1% of the total employed 
population. Groups 11 to 20 accounted for 1.2% and 
0.7%, respectively, while groups 21 to 30 employed 
0.7% and 0.4% of the total, in that year.
The share of  operating profit is measured by 
the ratio between the sum of net total profits earned 
by the selected firms and the total operating profits 
reported in the national accounts. There is currently no 
information available on profits for 2007. Nonetheless, 
between 2004 and 2006, the share of  these firms 
in operating profits nationwide rose from 3.3% to 
3.5%. In the latter case, while the top 10 groups 
contributed 2.5% of national profits, in 2004 their 
share was 2.6%. 
With regard to other information sources, 
Rendón and Morales (2008b, pp. 1,178 and 1,180-
1,181) argue that concentration in favour of  the 
larger firms and business groups clearly increased. 
Between 1993 and 2003, large firms employed 21.1% 
and 28.4% respectively of all persons employed in the 
economy. The 5,000 largest Mexican firms reported 
by Expansión had net sales equivalent to 18.2% of 
gdp in 1990, 50% in 2000, and as much as 73.5% 
in 2004. In the latter year, 5.4% of these firms were 
State-owned, 57.8% were domestic private-sector 
firms, and 36.8% were foreign. 
Table 2 shows a number of financial ratios applied 
to the 100 business groups, and also to a selection of 
those groups by decile. The chosen ratios include the 
asset turnover rate, defined as total sales divided by 
the value of total assets. The second ratio measures 
average output per employed worker, calculated 
the quotient between total sales and the number of 
workers, in millions of pesos at current prices. The 
third ratio, subject to stock-market fluctuations, is 
the quotient between the groups’ market value (stock 
market capitalization) and total assets. Leveraging 
ratios are then presented —total liabilities in relation 
to total assets, and total liabilities in relation to equity. 
Lastly, the table shows the ratio of net profits to equity 
as a percentage.
Taking the 100 enterprises as a whole, asset 
turnover increased between 2004 and 2007, which 
implies better exploitation of total assets. Groups 
11-50 make better use of total assets than the first 
10 groups, where turnover is lower. Asset turnover is 
highest among groups 31-50. The lower turnover of 
total assets displayed by the top 10 business groups 
reflects the existence of greater idle installed capacity, 
stemming from “overinvestment” aimed at erecting 
entry barriers against competitors, by raising equipment 
standards. These firms overinvest to raise barriers 
and would have the capacity to respond more quickly 
to unforeseen changes in demand. This defensive 
strategy has also been reported by Mortimore and 
Peres (2001, p. 54).
The average output per worker for all enterprises 
analysed has also increased, but only from 2005 
to 2007, having fallen between 2004 and 2005. 
By decile, the highest value corresponds to the 10 
leading enterprises, followed by groups 31-40. The 
ratio of market capitalization to total assets has also 
increased between 2004 and 2007, reflecting the better 
performance of the price index and prices quoted on 
the Mexican stock exchange. This ratio is also higher 
in the case of the 10 leading business groups, and 
among those in positions 31-50.
Leveraging indicators for the period 2004-2007 
do not display a clear trend and are less variable in 
the case of total liabilities/total assets. The other ratio 
of total liabilities with respect to capital fluctuates 
more. Both ratios rose between 2006 and 2007. Total 
liabilities grew to 60% of total assets, and 148% of 
equity set of enterprises as a whole. The 10 leading 
groups have slightly higher ratios, equivalent to 62% 
and 161%, respectively, in 2007. 
The last ratio is the quotient between net profit 
and equity, which rose from 14% to 24% between 
2004 and 2007. The top 10 groups have the highest 
rates of return in all years, whereas the other deciles 
display lower rates. The larger the size, the higher the 
absolute and relative returns.
Figure 1 shows concentration levels among total 
assets, total liabilities and equity, for the 100 largest 
enterprise groups in Mexico. The 10 largest domestic 
groups have been increasing their share of total assets: 
60.8% in 2005, 62.9% in 2006 and 66.8% in 2007. The 
top 10 groups had 59.1% of total liabilities in 2005, 
63.7% in 2006, and 69% in 2007. Equity shows no 
clear trend, however, with the share in those years 
fluctuating between 63.1% in 2005, 61.8% in 2006, 
and 63.5% in 2007. 
These high concentrations are ratified through 
the Herfindahl-Hirschmann index (hhi), for the 
various deciles of the 100 leading business groups in 
Mexico. In this case, the index is defined as the sum 
of the squares of the shares of total assets of each 
181
GRoWTh And ConCEnTRATIon AmonG ThE LEAdInG bUSInESS GRoUPS In mExICo  •  GERmán ALARCo And PATRICIA dEL hIERRo
C E P A L  R E V I E W  1 0 1  •  A U G U S T  2 0 1 0
TABLE 2
financial ratios of Mexican business groups, 2004-2007











Groups 1 to 10 2004 0.58 2.08 0.71 0.61 1.54 15.41
2005 0.66 1.80 1.07 0.56 1.28 18.41
2006 0.81 2.12 1.58 0.55 1.22 22.04
2007 0.82 2.21 1.69 0.62 1.61 28.86
Groups 11 to 20 2004 0.97 1.27 0.83 0.49 0.98 15.49
2005 0.68 1.33 0.41 0.65 1.86 17.75
2006 1.07 1.34 0.75 0.54 1.15 17.96
2007 1.12 1.25 1.13 0.57 1.30 16.70
Groups 21 to 30 2004 0.81 0.90 0.62 0.58 1.38 5.87
2005 0.95 1.23 1.01 0.46 0.86 9.89
2006 1.19 1.22 1.13 0.57 1.33 15.85
2007 1.41 1.29 1.04 0.57 1.32 18.74
Groups 31 to 40 2004 0.82 1.17 0.62 0.50 1.00 7.07
2005 0.91 1.31 0.43 0.61 1.54 10.32
2006 0.77 1.15 0.76 0.55 1.20 11.83
2007 1.27 1.50 1.17 0.55 1.24 8.88
Groups 41 to 50 2004 1.45 1.49 0.59 0.55 1.22 11.11
2005 0.43 0.77 0.33 0.68 2.16 16.40
2006 0.98 0.95 0.88 0.55 1.22 11.55
2007 0.64 1.02 1.31 0.43 0.75 17.29
Groups 51 to 100 2004 0.70 1.18 0.40 0.62 1.64 2.27
2005 0.57 1.13 0.28 0.60 1.53 6.93
2006 0.98 1.22 0.44 0.45 0.83 7.64
2007 0.65 1.06 0.46 0.58 1.40 8.77
Total 2004 0.67 1.62 0.69 0.59 1.44 13.65
2005 0.68 1.51 0.84 0.58 1.36 16.16
2006 0.89 1.62 1.28 0.54 1.19 19.02
2007 0.88 1.70 1.45 0.60 1.48 23.52
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (inegi).
a Millions of pesos per worker at current prices.
decile in the total of the 100 groups.3 The maximum 
hhi value is therefore 10,000 when a decile accounts 
for 100% of total assets (maximum concentration). A 







, where Si is each group’s share in the total.
decile can be classified as deconcentrated (hhi<1,000), 
moderately concentrated (1,000< hhi <1,800) or 
highly concentrated (hhi >1,800). The available 
information shows that asset concentration is clearly 
very high and increasing through time, since the hhi 
for 2005 was 4,506.4, compared to 4,672.5 in 2006, 
and 5,208.7 in 2007.
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FIGURE 1
distribution of assets, liabilities and equity 
among Mexican business groups, 2005-2007
(Percentages)







Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
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Table 3 provides data on the key accounting categories 
for all Mexican firms in 2004 through 2007, in millions 
of pesos at current prices, including total assets, total 
liabilities, equity, total sales and net profits. The table 
includes information not only for the total, but also 
the first five deciles (positions 1-10, 11-20, 21-30, 
31-40, 41-50), along with the subtotal of values for 
firms located in positions 51 to 100. 
An initial aspect to stress is that local sales 
decreased between 2004 and 2005, along with the 
total assets, liabilities and the equity of all enterprises. 
Only net profits grew in that period. There are several 
possible explanations for this. Firstly, it may reflect 
the presence of adjustments in accounting criteria 
ordered by the government authorities, relating to 
the consolidation of firms in a single business group. 
Secondly, it may stem from the combination of the 
accounting criteria mentioned above, with the sale of 
assets or equity by national groups to foreign owners, 
although the fdi data for those years do not report a 
significant increase in assets held by foreigners. 
Lastly, it is important to note that the changes 
that occurred between 2004 and 2005 in some of the 
top 10 Mexican groups (Slim, Larrea, Fernández, 
IV
Growth and dynamic of the business
groups, 2004-2007
TABLE 3
values of the main accounting categories of Mexican business groups, 2004-2007
(Millions of pesos at current prices)
Group Year Total assets Total liabilities Total equity Sales Net profits
Groups 1 - 10 2004 2 265 072.0 1 374 430.0 890 642.0 1 314 944.0 137 250.0
2005 1 722 874.9 966 419.7 756 455.3 1 141 545.5 139 267.8
2006 1 615 730.7 888 420.5 727 310.3 1 302 136.5 160 293.4
2007 1 934 035.2 1 192 394.4 741 640.7 1 579 250.8 214 041.2
Groups 11 - 20 2004 291 554.0 143 978.0 147 576.0 284 168.0 22 857.0
2005 419 231.0 272 472.1 146 758.8 283 991.4 26 053.7
2006 395 449.6 211 700.8 183 748.8 423 366.5 32 995.3
2007 335 344.7 189 553.9 145 790.9 375 056.5 24 341.3
Groups 21 - 30 2004 167 222.0 96 864.0 70 358.0 134 669.0 4 128.0
2005 205 516.2 94 855.3 110 660.8 194 277.1 10 948.0
2006 175 905.6 100 453.0 75 452.6 209 954.2 11 956.9
2007 172 219.9 97 955.0 74 264.9 242 440.5 13 920.8
Groups 31 - 40 2004 126 921.0 63 579.0 63 342.0 103 838.0 4 481.0
2005 159 153.1 96 442.0 62 711.0 144 607.1 6 471.5
2006 133 482.0 72 909.0 60 573.1 102 255.7 7 164.3
2007 111 558.2 61 808.5 49 749.7 141 402.5 4 417.6
Groups 41 - 50 2004 70 022.0 38 544.0 31 478.0 101 312.0 3 496.0
2005 85 849.4 58 681.8 27 167.6 36 942.6 4 456.6
2006 82 866.0 45 510.7 37 355.3 80 883.5 4 314.3
2007 88 971.3 38 078.4 50 893.0 56 676.4 8 801.8
Groups - to 100 2004 184 840.0 114 764.0 70 076.0 129 632.0 1 591.0
2005 242 684.5 146 697.8 95 986.7 137 580.6 6 647.1
2006 167 056.0 75 553.1 91 502.8 163 248.5 6 995.0
2007 253 811.9 147 997.0 105 814.9 166 019.6 9 283.2
Total 2004 3 105 631.0 1 832 159.0 1 273 472.0 2 068 563.0 173 803.0
2005 2 835 309.1 1 635 568.8 1 199 740.3 1 938 944.3 193 844.7
2006 2 570 489.9 1 394 547.1 1 175 942.8 2 281 844.9 223 719.2
2007 2 895 941.2 1 727 787.2 1 168 154.0 2 560 846.3 274 805.9
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (inegi).
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Garza Medina and Salinas Pliego) explain most of the 
amounts observed for the 100 leading business groups. 
The higher level of total assets, liabilities and equity 
in 2004 compared to the 2005 figures, can also be seen 
in the deciles containing the smaller business groups, 
apart from those located in positions 41-50.
The total sales of  the 100 leading domestic 
enterprises increased between 2005 and 2007, while 
total assets retreated 2005-2006, before recovering 
between 2006 and 2007. Total liabilities moved in a 
similar way, contracting again in 2005 and 2006, before 
rising from 2006 to 2007. In the case of equity, there 
has been a slight long-term declining trend despite 
profits expanding from year to year. 
Table 4 shows the annual financial flows of total 
assets, which are explained by the variation in total 
liabilities and equity for all of the 100 large Mexican 
enterprises (presented by decile). Only information for 
the period 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 is shown, because 
the period 2004-2005 involves the methodological 
elements referred to above. As information from just 
two years in particular is used, it is not considered 
necessary to transform from millions of current pesos 
to constant prices basis. 
An initial comment on the available information is 
that the higher sales levels are not supported by changes 
in total assets: financial, fixed or intangible. These 
levels, reflecting higher domestic or external demand, 
stem from higher turnover in relation to total assets 
and the investment decisions taken discontinuously 
through time. Given the scant information available, 
it is impossible to establish other hypotheses on this. 
From 2005 to 2006, total assets declined, matched 
by a larger reduction in total liabilities with respect 
to equity. This phenomenon is general and could be 
explained by accounting or other reasons.
Between 2006 and 2007, there was significant 
growth in total assets among the 100 enterprises 
analysed. Nonetheless, the behaviour is different, 
because most of the increase is explained by what 
happened in the top 10 groups, and among the 
smallest, located in positions 41-100. There is a sharp 
drop in the value of  assets and liabilities among 
groups 11-40. The other relevant observation, when 
working with the set of firms as a whole, is that the 
main adjustment variable are liabilities, with equity 
fluctuating by less. 
As a whole, the 100 largest firms are financed 
overwhelmingly by third-party capital (liabilities), 
supported by small equity capital injections. The 
situation is clear in the case of the 10 leading business 
groups, whose total asset expansion is financed with 
liabilities, and to a lesser extent through an equity 
expansion. In contrast, the latter is more important 
as a financing mechanism among groups in positions 
41-100, especially those ranked 41-50, whose total 
TABLE 4
financial flows of Mexican groups, 2005-2007a
(Millions of pesos at current prices)
Groups Year Variation in total assets Variation in total liabilities Variation in equity
Groups 1 - 10 2005-2006 -107 144.2 -77 999.2 -29 145.0
2006-2007 318 304.5 303 974.0 14 330.5
Groups 11 - 20 2005-2006 -23 781.4 -60 771.3 36 989.9
2006-2007 -60 104.9 -22 147.0 -37 957.9
Groups 21 - 30 2005-2006 -29 610.6 5 597.7 -35 208.3
2006-2007 -3 685.7 -2 498.0 -1 187.7
Groups 31 - 40 2005-2006 -25 671.0 -23 533.1 -2 138.0
2006-2007 -21 923.9 -11 100.5 -10 823.4
Groups 41 - 50 2005-2006 -2 983.4 -13 171.1 10 187.7
2006-2007 6 105.3 -7 432.4 13 537.6
Groups 51 - 100 2005-2006 -75 628.6 -71 144.7 -4 483.9
2006-2007 86 755.9 72 443.9 14 312.0
Total = US$100 2005-2006 -264 819.2 -241 021.7 -23 797.5
2006-2007 325 451.2 333 240.1 -7 788.8
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (inegi).
a Firms listed as ranked by Expansión 2008 for 2007.
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asset expansion is explained by an increase in equity 
and a reduction in total liabilities.
Corporate financing through liabilities includes 
funding through the domestic banking and international 
banking systems, the issuance of debt securities floated 
on local and international markets, among the main 
financial instruments. For reference purposes only, it 
is interesting to note that between 2006 and 2007, the 
expansion of liabilities among the 100 leading Mexican 
business groups accounted for 76.2% of the increase 
in lending by the financial system to the private sector, 
according to data reported in International Financial 
Statistics published by the International Monetary 
Fund (imf, 2009).
Table 5 shows the results of  cross-section 
regressions that aim to explain the growth in sales and 
total assets between 2005 and 2007, of the groups and 
businesses reported by Expansión. It is claimed that sales 
growth depends directly on the fixed-asset turnover 
ratio and growth of total assets, while the latter would 
be explained more by growth and liabilities than by 
contributions made by shareholders (equity). Annexes 
1 and 2 provide the basic information used for these 
regressions, converted into percentage variations to 
improve the goodness of fit of the regressions. 
The results show that the first regression does 
not reject the hypothesis that the percentage change 
in sales growth depends positively on the percentage 
change in the ratio between total sales and total assets, 
and the percentage change in total assets. The second 
equation is also unable to reject the hypothesis that 
the percentage change in total assets depends firstly 
on the percentage change in liabilities and secondly 
on equity. There is no direct link with the percentage 
change in net profits for the fiscal year. 
The two equations display a goodness of fit of 
over and 60% and 90%, respectively, which are high 
values for cross-section regressions using percentage 
variations. The parameters reflect the logic of  the 
hypothesis, since they have the correct signs and 
are significantly different from zero according to 
the t-test. Overall, they are also different from zero 
according to the F-test. Both cases considered data 
for firms with complete information for the period 
2005-2007: 69 in all. Neither regression detected 
problems of autocorrelation, heteroscedasticity or 
multicollinearity. 
No detailed analysis will be made of  the 
sources of  total-asset growth among the leading 
business groups or enterprises in Mexico, because 
TABLE 5
Main results of sales growth regressions 
Independent variables
Dependent variables
Percentage change in sales, 
2005-2007




Percentage change in the ratio of  sales/assets, 2005-2007 0.2794  
(10.1443)  
Percentage change in total assets, 2005-2007 0.8348  
(4.4317)  
Percentage change in total liabilities, 2005-2007  0.5563
 (19.3295)
Percentage change in equity, 2005-2007  0.4618
 (7.4837)
Percentage change in profits, 2005-2007  -0.0002
 (-0.1210)
R2 0.6093 0.9092
Adjusted R2 0.5974 0.9050
F -test 51.4541 216.9358
Durbin-Watson test 1.8482 1.9499
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (inegi).
Note: t-test values shown under the respective parameters.
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the secondary information is still fragmented. 
Nonetheless, it may be interesting to note that from 
2006 to 2007, four of the 10 leading domestic groups 
increased their levels of  debt in relative to assets 
(Zambrano-Cemex, Garza Medina-Alfa, Fernández 
González-Modelo and González Barrera-Maseca), 
while three maintained them (Slim, Bailléres-Bal 
and Salinas Pliego-Elektra) and three reduced them 
(Larrea-Grupo México, Fernández Carbajal-Femsa 
and Servitje-Bimbo).
Lastly, unlike other countries, Mexican business 
groups do not generally have financial institutions 
either under their control or forming part of the group 
itself. In 2007, only 12 of the 100 leading Mexican 
enterprises had associated financial institutions or 
enterprises for which financial services were the core 
of their activities. In the top 10 national groups, only 
Slim-Grupo Financiero (gf) Inbursa and González 
Barrera-gf  Banorte have direct financial links; in 
groups 11 to 20, there are just two: Salinas Pliego-
Banco Elektra and Del Valle Ruiz-gf  Ve por Más 
and in positions 31 - 40, there are just gf  Ixe and gf  
Invex. Positions 51 to 100 include genuine financial 
groups, but of small national scope: Banco del Bajío, 
gf  Banregio, gf  Interacciones, gf  Afirme, gf  Mifel 
and gf  Monex.
V
final thoughts
The formation of business groups in Mexico replicates 
the dynamic that has unfolded in most Latin American 
countries. Groups arose mainly during the early 
industrialization period in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries, then during the import 
substitution process between the 1950s and 1970s, and 
again following the neoliberal productive restructuring 
of the 1980s. New groups emerge over time, while some 
maintain their presence, and others fade away.
Various hypotheses have been put forward to 
explain the origin and functioning of business groups. 
An extensive review of  the literature shows that 
many issues are still under discussion and conclusive 
evidence is scarce. The main arguments claim that 
groups emerge as a result of failings or shortcomings 
in various markets, but other explanations also seem 
to be valid, which posit linkages between these groups 
and the State. Business groups maintain a complex 
relation of mutual support with the State (depending 
on the government); but distancing occurs in some 
circumstances.
The financial statements of any business group or 
firm can be used to identify the sources of expansion 
of  total assets (financial, fixed and intangible) as 
a counterpart to changes in liabilities and equity. 
The sources of  liability growth are domestic and 
international bank financing, the issuance of national 
and international debt, and other liabilities. Capital 
growth occurs through retained profits and new 
share issues. The proportions between liabilities 
and capital are determined in accordance with 
domestic and international sector parameters, and 
the specific evaluation of  the financial or business 
group in question.
Based on available information, it is clear that 
Mexican business groups are making a growing 
contribution to gdp, reflecting a process of concentration 
and centralization of  sales, total assets, liabilities 
and equity in the hands of just a few groups. The 
contribution of  these groups to employment and 
operating profits is less, however; but this reflects higher 
levels of productivity than in other firms in the economy. 
No evaluation has been made of transnational firms 
and other smaller domestic enterprises.
There is a concentration phenomenon in favour 
of the 10 leading Mexican business groups, to the 
detriment of other groups and businesses registered 
by Expansión. The 10 leading groups account for over 
60% of total assets, liabilities and equity. Between 2005 
and 2007, the share of total assets and liabilities has 
been growing, reflecting increasing concentration; and 
this seems to be positively correlated with earnings, 
since return on equity (roe) has also been rising during 
the period under analysis.
Sales growth among business groups is explained 
by increases in the fixed asset turnover ratio (total 
sales/total assets) and the growth of total assets, as 
can be inferred from a direct analysis of  financial 
information and cross-section regressions. Moreover, 
the different business groups do not invest continuously 
through time, but in discrete jumps (sporadically), 
to exploit specific advantages that may be related 
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to the real exchange rate, interest rates, tariffs, and 
other variables.
Although most Mexican business groups do not 
have very close relations with firms in the financial 
sector, as previously was a characteristic feature, in 
the period under analysis from 2005 to 2007, the main 
source for financing total asset growth was third-party 
capital (debt) and a proportionately smaller equity 
expansion. The leading business groups, particularly the 
top 10, exploit their position to gain more third-party 
capital through a higher leveraging than the average 
among Mexican business groups and enterprises.
Of the 15 largest business groups, three stand 
out: Slim, González Barrera and Salinas Pliego, which 
have performed very dynamically since the 1980s and 
have their own financial institutions. In contrast, the 
smaller business groups located in positions 41-100 
need to draw on equity more than third-party capital to 
finance their asset growth. Those located in positions 
41-50 self-financed the expansion of their total assets 
in the period under analysis.
The lower asset turnover rate among the 10 leading 
business groups reflects a feature commented on by 
other authors, namely that as part of their defensive 
strategies these firms tend to overinvest, generating 
entry barriers for competitors. Lower turnover would 
mean less productive use of their assets; but these 
firms are willing to accept the opportunity cost of 
underuse to guarantee growth spaces for their groups. 
Similarly, it should not be forgotten that these larger 
groups probably face lower financial costs than other 
smaller groups and enterprises.
Lastly, an important finding in relation to Mexican 
business groups is that business networks may be large 
and more or less complex, and have both offensive 
and defensive strategies; but the capital structure 
remains highly traditional, with clear presence and 
control by a family group in particular. It is also clear 
that none of the large Mexican groups occupies a 
significant place in high technology sectors (Salas-
Porras, 2006a, p. 6).
(Original: Spanish)
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ANNEX 1
Basic statistics for the econometric regressions, 2005-2007
(Millions of pesos at current prices)
Business groups/enterprises
Sales Total assets Total liabilities
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007
Grupo Carso, América Móvil, Imbursa (Carlos Slim Helú & Sons) 495 434.1 618 238.6 669 234.49 782 354.99 371 796.94 488 971.87
Cemex (Lorenzo Zambrano Treviño) 162 708.6 236 669.0 293 138.56 370 126.53 183 211.60 231 329.08
Grupo México (Germán Larrea Mota Velasco) 58 101.8 80 950.2 99 512.20 81 865.12 41 463.41 29 237.54
Fomento Económico Mexicano (José Antonio Fernández Carbajal) 105 581.7 147 556.1 127 642.28 99 505.10 60 782.04 45 229.59
Grupo Alfa (Dionisio Garza Medina) 69 334.8 106 832.7 61 966.70 74 323.26 29 507.95 41 290.70
Grupo Modelo (Carlos Fernández González) 49 550.5 72 894.6 80 311.38 71 325.47 12 168.39 12 736.69
Gruma y Banorte (Roberto González Barrera) 63 856.4 97 308.6 240 468.45 224 355.33 200 390.37 186 962.78
Grupo Bimbo (Daniel Servitje Montull) 56 102.2 72 293.6 36 270.51 36 797.82 16 486.60 13 628.82
Grupo Bal (Alberto Bailléres González) 57 278.4 85 127.4 76 248.60 104 607.88 54 463.29 74 719.92
Grupo Salinas Elektra (Ricardo Salinas Pliego) 47 075.9 61 380.0 70 101.08 88 773.67 58 417.57 68 287.44
Organización Soriana (Ricargo Martín Bringas) 48 394.4 65 190.7 35 798.32 54 005.17 14 915.97 30 002.87
Grupo Televisa (Emilio Azcárraga Jean) 32 481.0 41 561.5 78 532.05 85 121.11 35 696.39 50 071.24
Mexichem (Antonio del Valle Ruiz) 8 677.4 24 236.9 91 030.97 16 104.43 56 894.35 11 503.16
Grupo Coppel (Enrique Coppel Luken) 19 607.5 34 752.7 18 733.54 33 933.85 10 407.52 22 622.57
Empresas ICA (Bernardo Quintana Isaac) 18 404.9 22 447.8 31 241.39 18 372.94 18 377.29 8 749.02
Comercial Mexicana (Guillermo González Nova and Carlos González Zabalegui) 40 308.9 50 409.2 30 453.33 34 886.57 13 842.42 15 857.53
Liverpool (Max David Michel and Max Michel Souberville) 32 055.2 42 976.3 36 910.44 42 109.51 17 576.40 19 140.69
Axtel y Avantel (Tomás Milmo Santos) 4 966.8 12 190.6 10 872.34 16 789.51 3 749.08 9 327.51
Grupo Xignux (Eugenio Garza Herrera) 21 983.1 39 142.7 15 352.04 12 737.86 9 030.61 7 076.59
Homex (Eustaquio Tomás de Nicolás Gutiérrez) 8 571.4 16 166.1 14 143.73 17 598.52 8 319.84 10 352.07
Bachoco (Francisco Robinson Bours-Castelo) 14 437.4 18 208.8 15 286.38 17 068.65 2 779.34 3 555.97
Grupo Acerero del Norte (Xavier Autrey Maza and Alonso Ancira Elizondo) 22 718.0 27 379.0 40 265.28 36 682.58 28 760.92 24 455.05
Casas Geo (Luis Orvañanos Lascurain) 10 091.3 14 975.6 13 495.70 14 883.51 8 434.81 8 268.62
Arca (Manuel Barragán Morales and Miguel Fernández Iturriza) 14 647.0 18 572.7 14 178.57 15 602.39 3 832.05 4 216.86
Kimberly-Clark (Claudio X. González Laporte and Pablo González Guajardo) 21 983.1 21 480.2 25 247.33 22 765.19 13 288.07 13 391.29
Fragua (Javier Arroyo Chávez) 9 832.2 14 575.2 3 811.36 4 594.67 1 732.44 1 997.68
Grupo Posadas (Gastón Azcárraga Andrade) 5 126.8 25 948.9 11 865.63 17 941.06 6 592.01 13 800.81
Grupo Simec (Rufino Vigil González) 16 219.0 27 640.1 19 314.24 19 489.57 6 230.40 4 753.55
Urbi (Cuauhtémoc Peréz Román Urbi) 8 194.3 12 779.4 12 376.05 16 218.86 5 625.48 7 723.27
Grupo Kuo (Fernando Senderos Mestre) 24 577.4 22 722.8 24 460.23 20 343.34 11 647.73 11 301.86
Corporación Durango (Miguel Rincón Arredondo) 8 150.4 15 430.0 14 400.00 14 653.13 9 600.00 9 768.75
Quálitas Compañía de Seguros (Joaquín Brockman Lozano) 4 450.3 8 593.4 4 955.84 11 031.07 4 129.87 10 028.25
Alsea (Cosme Alberto Torrado Martínez) 4 318.3 7 047.3 3 039.07 4 369.28 1 266.28 1 820.53
Grupo Lamosa (Federico Toussaint Elosúa) 3 782.0 6 817.3 5 494.06 11 423.86 2 616.22 8 159.90
Grupo Continental (Cynthia Helena Grossman) 10 623.8 12 283.3 8 900.13 9 394.08 1 934.81 1 957.10
Interacciones (Carlos Hank Rhon) 1 773.3 11 055.1 9 412.80 3 098.05 7 844.00 1 032.68
Grupo Embotelladoras Unidas (Juan Gallardo Thurlow) 6 304.3 7 713.6 4 664.87 3 841.39 2 028.21 1 670.17
Consorcio ARA (Gemán Ahumada Russek) 6 772.7 9 257.3 9 685.22 11 543.01 2 934.92 4 439.62
Minera Autlán (José Antonio Rivero Larrea) 2 097.9 2 461.7 2 667.11 2 917.99  919.69 1 080.74
Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (Federico Terrazas Torres) 4 722.9 8 453.2 11 159.42 15 641.39 3 985.51 7 109.72
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste (Fernando Chico Pardo) 2 063.8 2 785.9 14 114.58 15 967.29 1 037.84 2 073.67
Ixe Grupo Financiero (Enrique Luis Castillo Sánchez Mejorada) 2 261.7 6 460.0 22 641.67 15 410.96 20 583.33 12 842.47
Grupo Gigante (Ángel Losada Moreno) 32 524.6 27 115.3 28 514.10 27 583.94 12 397.44 11 493.31
Promotora Ambiental (Alberto Garza Santos) 2 096.5 3 004.5 2 477.71 2 843.04  952.96 1 292.29
Verzatec (Eugenio Clariond Reyes) 39 182.1 7 148.4 35 469.47 33 221.82 15 421.51 10 381.82
Promotora y Operación de Infraestructura (David Peñalosa Sandoval) 2 645.8 2 715.5 6 450.18 10 620.09 5 863.80 9 654.63
Corporación Interamericana de Entretenimiento (Alejandro Soberón Kuri) 8 658.9 10 187.9 15 672.84 9 786.37 9 795.52 6 116.48
SANLUIS Rassini (Antonio Madero Bracho) 6 841.0 7 999.7 8 190.48 3 200.63 5 119.05 2 133.75
Grupo Transportación Marítima Mexicana (José Francisco Serrano Segovia) 3 260.5 3 306.8 8 631.50 12 156.15 7 192.91 10 130.12
Grupo Martí (Alfredo Harp Helú) 2 322.7 3 282.0 2 969.70 3 442.50 1 414.14 1 912.50
Internacional de Cerámica (Óscar Almeida Chabre) 4 462.0 5 503.4 4 465.51 4 629.50 2 480.84 2 571.94
Corporacion Mexicana de Restaurantes (Joaquín Vargas Guajardo) 1 137.4 1 643.7 1 092.86 1 366.47  242.86  440.80
Mifiel Grupo Financiero (Daniel Becker Feldman) 1 248.7 2 597.1 4 877.78 14 532.45 4 064.81 13 211.31
(continues overleaf)
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(continued)
Business groups/enterprises
Sales Total assets Total liabilities
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007
Invex Grupo Financiero (Juan Guichard Michel) 889.7 3 976.9 9 137.36 11 682.19 7 028.74 8, 986.30
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo (Jorge Ballesteros Franco) 1 080.1 1 517.9 3 866.10 3 734.13 1 431.89 1 383.01
Grupo Collado (Guillermo Vogel Hinojosa) 4 954.2 5 883.2 3 371.43 4 330.19 2 107.14 3 092.99
Médica Sur (Misael Uribe Esquivel y Manuel Martínez López) 1 069.4 1 397.2 1 566.65 1 742.52  540.23  528.04
Monex Grupo Financiero (Héctor Lagos Cué and Héctor Lagos Dondé) 1 335.0 2 232.0 2 399.51 1 975.28 1 090.69 1 097.38
Grupo Industrial Saltillo (Ernesto López de Nigris and Juan Carlos López Villarreal) 9 518.2 8 823.7 12 366.67 10 480.18 6 183.33 4 556.60
Grupo Famsa (Humberto Garza González) 10 611.3 14 181.2 10 968.49 14 029.05 7 312.33 8 252.38
Grupo Casa Saba (Isaac Saba Raffoul) 21 829.3 25 126.5 10 008.28 11 157.17 5 267.52 5 872.20
Grupo Bafar (Óscar Eugenio Baeza Farés) 3 407.6 4 318.7 2 741.74 3 330.13 1 096.70 1 189.33
Sare (Dionisio Sánchez Carbajal) 3 370.7 4 899.2 4 926.07 5 364.84 1 894.64 2 554.69
Grupo la Moderna (Eduardo Monroy Cárdenas) 3 676.1 4 651.8 4 216.38 4 035.01  795.54  733.64
Grupo Ruba (Enrique Terrazas Torres) 2 557.0 4 567.6 2 511.22 3 587.37 1 141.47 1 559.72
Copamex (Juan Bosco Maldonado Quiroga) 4 724.7 5 562.5 6 800.00 7 287.80 3 400.00 3 643.90
Grupo Minsa (Raymundo, Armando, Alfonso and Guillermo Gómez Flores) 2 214.2 3 033.1 2 085.12 2 604.64  347.52  685.43
Grupo Accel (Eloy Vallina Lagüera) 1 537.3 1 726.1 1 713.13 1 628.85  535.35  542.95
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (inegi). 
ANNEX 2
Basic statistics for the econometric regressions, 2005-2007
(Millions of pesos at current prices)
Business groups/enterprises
Equity Net profit Ratio sales/assets
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007
Grupo Carso, América Móvil, Imbursa (Carlos Slim Helú & Sons) 297 437.55 293 383.12 70 492.7 122 370.1 0.74 0.79
Cemex (Lorenzo Zambrano Treviño) 109 926.96 138 797.45 22 425.1 26 107.8 0.56 0.64
Grupo México (Germán Larrea Mota Velasco) 58 048.78 52 627.58 7 140.0 18 356.5 0.58 0.99
Fomento Económico Mexicano (José Antonio Fernández Carbajal) 66 860.24 54 275.51 5 549.4 8 510.4 0.83 1.48
Grupo Alfa (Dionisio Garza Medina) 32 458.75 33 032.56 7 790.1 3 551.0 1.12 1.44
Grupo Modelo (Carlos Fernánez González) 68 142.99 58 588.78 7 291.3 9 503.1 0.62 1.02
Gruma y Banorte (Roberto González Barrera) 40 078.07 37 392.56 7 494.6 9 744.5 0.27 0.43
Grupo Bimbo (Daniel Servitje Montull) 19 783.92 23 169.00 2 829.1 3 811.3 1.55 1.96
Grupo Bal (Alberto Bailléres González) 21 785.31 29 887.97 3 115.3 5 762.4 0.75 0.81
Grupo Salinas Elektra (Ricardo Salinas Pliego) 11 683.51 20 486.23 5 386.1 6 324.1 0.67 0.69
Organización Soriana (Ricargo Martín Bringas) 20 882.35 24 002.30 2 130.0 3 134.7 1.35 1.21
Grupo Televisa (Emilio Azcárraga Jean) 42 835.66 35 049.87 6 125.5 8 082.5 0.41 0.49
Mexichem (Antonio del Valle Ruiz) 34 136.61 4 601.27 6 247.0 2 108.3 0.10 1.50
Grupo Coppel (Enrique Coppel Luken) 8 326.02 11 311.28 1 024.1 2 616.3 1.05 1.02
Empresas ICA (Bernardo Quintana Isaac) 12 864.10 9 623.92  501.7 -893.1 0.59 1.22
Comercial Mexicana (Guillermo González Nova and Carlos González Zabalegui) 16 610.91 19 029.04 1 827.2 2 555.6 1.32 1.44
Liverpool (Max David Michel and Max Michel Souberville) 19 334.04 22 968.82 2 726.1 3 831.2 0.87 1.02
Axtel y Avantel (Tomás Milmo Santos) 7 123.26 7 462.01  306.3 491.0 0.46 0.73
Grupo Xignux (Eugenio Garza Herrera) 6 321.43 5 661.27  531.0 1 049.6 1.43 3.07
Homex (Eustaquio Tomás de Nicolás Gutiérrez) 5 823.89 7 246.45 1 048.3 2 193.5 0.61 0.92
Bachoco (Francisco Robinson Bours-Castelo) 12 507.04 13 512.68 1 776.0 1 278.3 0.94 1.07
Grupo Acerero del Norte (Xavier Autrey Maza and Alonso Ancira Elizondo) 11 504.37 12 227.53 2 634.5 1 972.3 0.56 0.75
Casas Geo (Luis Orvañanos Lascurain) 5 060.89 6 614.89 1 138.7 1 448.0 0.75 1.01
Arca (Manuel Barragán Morales and Miguel Fernández Iturriza) 10 346.52 11 385.53 1 934.8 2 501.4 1.03 1.19
Kimberly-Clark (Claudio X. González Laporte and Pablo González Guajardo) 11 959.26 9 373.90 2 906.1 3 728.0 0.87 0.94
Fragua (Javier Arroyo Chávez) 2 078.92 2 596.99  463.6  672.1 2.58 3.17
Grupo Posadas (Gastón Azcárraga Andrade) 5 273.61 4 140.24  379.7  135.8 0.43 1.45
(continues overleaf)
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(continued)
Business groups/enterprises
Equity Net profit Ratio sales/assets
2005 2007 2005 2007 2005 2007
Grupo Simec (Rufino Vigil González) 13 083.84 14 736.02 1 295.3 1 791.9 0.84 1.42
Urbi (Cuauhtémoc Peréz Román Urbi) 6 750.57 8 495.60 1 174.6 1 832.5 0.66 0.79
Grupo Kuo (Fernando Senderos Mestre) 12 812.50 9 041.48  307.5 -828.2 1.00 1.12
Corporación Durango (Miguel Rincón Arredondo) 4 800.00 4 884.38  52.8 -312.6 0.57 1.05
Quálitas Compañía de Seguros (Joaquín Brockman Lozano)  825.97 1 002.82 - 63.6 35.5 0.90 0.78
Alsea (Cosme Alberto Torrado Martínez) 1 772.79 2 548.75 2 60.6 478.4 1.42 1.61
Grupo Lamosa (Federico Toussaint Elosúa) 2 877.84 3 263.96 5 06.5 900.2 0.69 0.60
Grupo Continental (Cynthia Helena Grossman) 6 965.32 7 436.98 1 2 05.0 1 604.9 1.19 1.31
Interacciones (Carlos Hank Rhon) 1 568.80 2 065.37 1 96.1 603.5 0.19 3.57
Grupo Embotelladoras Unidas (Juan Gallardo Thurlow) 2 636.67 2 171.22 1 58.2 294.2 1.35 2.01
Consorcio ARA (Gemán Ahumada Russek) 6 750.31 7 103.39 1 1 00.3 1 339.7 0.70 0.80
Minera Autlán (José Antonio Rivero Larrea) 1 747.41 1 837.25 2 02.7 296.9 0.79 0.84
Grupo Cementos de Chihuahua (Federico Terrazas Torres) 7 173.91 8 531.66 990.0 1 670.5 0.42 0.54
Grupo Aeroportuario del Sureste (Fernando Chico Pardo) 13 076.74 13 893.62 5 62.3 522.4 0.15 0.17
Ixe Grupo Financiero (Enrique Luis Castillo Sánchez Mejorada) 2 058.33 2 568.49 1 23.5 -75.0 0.10 0.42
Grupo Gigante (Ángel Losada Moreno) 16 116.67 16 090.63 - 96.7 4 722.6 1.14 0.98
Promotora Ambiental (Alberto Garza Santos) 1 524.74 1 550.75 1 47.9 93.2 0.85 1.06
Verzatec (Eugenio Clariond Reyes) 20 047.96 22 840.00 1 9 64.7 285.5 1.10 0.22
Promotora y Operación de Infraestructura (David Peñalosa Sandoval)  586.38  965.46 1 63.6 547.9 0.41 0.26
Corporación Interamericana de Entretenimiento (Alejandro Soberón Kuri) 5 877.31 3 669.89 -1 2 69.5 -569.2 0.55 1.04
SANLUIS Rassini (Antonio Madero Bracho) 3 071.43 1 066.88 - 21.5 -982.7 0.84 2.50
Grupo Transportación Marítima Mexicana (José Francisco Serrano Segovia) 1 438.58 2 026.02 1 8 27.0 -731.8 0.38 0.27
Grupo Martí (Alfredo Harp Helú) 1 555.56 1 530.00 1 12.0 76.5 0.78 0.95
Internacional de Cerámica (Óscar Almeida Chabre) 1 984.67 2 057.55 2 71.9 28.6 1.00 1.19
Corporacion Mexicana de Restaurantes (Joaquín Vargas Guajardo)  850.00  925.68  47.6 82.2 1.04 1.20
Mifiel Grupo Financiero (Daniel Becker Feldman)  812.96 1 321.13  87.8 79.4 0.26 0.18
Cydsa (Tomás González Sada) 4 402.67 4 205.02 -330.2 100.5 0.66 0.91
Invex Grupo Financiero (Juan Guichard Michel) 2 108.62 2 695.89 122.3 196.8 0.10 0.34
Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo (Jorge Ballesteros Franco) 2 434.21 2 351.12 185.0 136.6 0.28 0.41
Grupo Collado (Guillermo Vogel Hinojosa) 1 264.29 1 237.20 53.1 -45.9 1.47 1.36
Médica Sur (Misael Uribe Esquivel and Manuel Martínez López) 1 026.43 1 214.49 143.7 216.3 0.68 0.80
Monex Grupo Financiero (Héctor Lagos Cué y Héctor Lagos Dondé) 1 308.82  877.90 267.0 370.3 0.56 1.13
Grupo Industrial Saltillo (Ernesto López de Nigris and Juan Carlos López Villarreal) 6 183.33 5 923.58 74.2 364.3 0.77 0.84
Grupo Famsa (Humberto Garza González) 3 656.16 5 776.67 266.9 519.9 0.97 1.01
Grupo Casa Saba (Isaac Saba Raffoul) 4 740.76 5 284.98 744.3 921.7 2.18 2.25
Grupo Bafar (Óscar Eugenio Baeza Farés) 1 645.05 2 140.80 365.2 193.1 1.24 1.30
Sare (Dionisio Sánchez Carbajal) 3 031.43 2 810.16 318.3 487.0 0.68 0.91
Grupo la Moderna (Eduardo Monroy Cárdenas) 3 420.83 3 301.37 328.4 361.5 0.87 1.15
Grupo Ruba (Enrique Terrazas Torres) 1 369.76 2 027.64 339.7 579.5 1.02 1.27
Copamex (Juan Bosco Maldonado Quiroga) 3 400.00 3 643.90 17.0 74.7 0.69 0.76
Grupo Minsa (Raymundo, Armando, Alfonso and Guillermo Gómez Flores) 1 737.60 1 919.21 420.5 125.9 1.06 1.16
Grupo Accel (Eloy Vallina Lagüera) 1 177.78 1 085.90 21.2 49.3 0.90 1.06
Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of data obtained from the journal Expansión and from the National Institute of Statistics, 
Geography and Information (inegi).
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